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Many sincere compliments should be addressed to Bezalel Peleg and Hans
Peters, the authors of the book Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations
of Constitutions published last year by Springer. Our experience with the pre-
vious books of these authors on game theory (Peleg 1984; Peleg and Sudho¨lter
2003; Peters 1992, 2008) induces very high expectations with respect to this
jointly written monograph. And we have not been disappointed with their new
project.
The book studies stable representations of constitutions. The authors fol-
low Ga¨rdenfors (1981) who modeled constitutions as effectivity functions, a
term introduced independently by Moulin and Peleg (1982) in the general
context of game theory and its relation to social choice. An effectivity func-
tion assigns to each group in a society a collection of sets of social states. The
manuscript is based on work that has appeared over the last thirty years, but
it also contains many new results and new or improved proofs of existing re-
sults. Among various sources of the results collected in the book, the authors
used, e.g., Abdou (1988), Abdou and Keiding (1991), Holzman (1986), Keid-
ing and Peleg (2006), Peleg (1998, 2004), Peleg and Peters (2006, 2009), Peleg
et al. (2002). The emphasis in the book by Peleg and Peters is on strategic
stability of game forms that represent effectivity functions. As the authors
mention themselves, their aim is not to contribute substantially to the purely
philosophical literature on constitutions, and equity or fairness, but they focus
on representation and game-theoretic stability, and rather contribute to the
economic literature on mechanism design taken in a wide sense.
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2The volume of about 160 pages is divided into two parts, and contains in
total 11 chapters, preceded by a clear summary of the whole contents. Each
chapter begins with a short motivation and summary section, followed by its
main sections, and then it finishes by a short section with notes and comments.
Apart from clearly presented definitions and numerous results, the authors de-
liver many illustrative examples. The first part, built by the first seven chap-
ters, focuses on properties of game forms representing effectivity functions:
strategic stability properties, Pareto optimality of equilibrium outcomes, and
continuity properties of the game forms. In the introductory Chapter 1, after
recalling Arrow’s model of a social welfare function, Peleg and Peters present
a definition of a ‘rights-system’ by Ga¨rdenfors. The latter definition of a con-
stitution and a more detailed formalization of the concept of rights by Peleg
(1998) are adopted in the book. In Chapter 2 the authors formally describe a
constitution and the effectivity function that it induces. They present a new
proof of the representation theorem. Chapter 3 deals with a Nash consistent
game form, i.e., a game form that has a Nash equilibrium for every profile
of preferences. Necessary and sufficient conditions on an effectivity function
to have a Nash consistent representation are delivered. The authors consider
the case where the set of alternatives is finite, and then generalize the re-
sults to compact Hausdorff topological spaces of alternatives and topological
effectivity functions. They also discuss the relation between their results and
the Gibbard Paradox (Gibbard, 1974), and the ‘liberal paradox’ (Sen, 1970).
Chapter 4 is devoted to acceptable game forms, i.e., Nash consistent game
forms such that all Nash equilibrium outcomes for all preference profiles are
Pareto optimal. A complete characterization of the effectivity functions which
can be represented by an acceptable game form is delivered. Chapter 5 consid-
ers strongly consistent representations. Strongly consistent game forms admit
a strong Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences, where a strong Nash
equilibrium is a strategy profile which is resistant to deviations of all coalitions
(including one-person coalitions). First the authors study necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for the existence of strongly consistent representations in case
the set of alternatives is finite, and then they extend their results to topological
effectivity functions and deliver a new result. Chapter 6 concerns representa-
tions by Nash-consistent game forms when even-chance lotteries on subsets
of alternatives are allowed. The authors show that in such a case, constitu-
tions have Nash consistent representations without the restrictive intersection
assumption. In Chapter 7 Peleg and Peters investigate the continuity of the
outcome function of a representation when the outcome space and the strat-
egy sets are compact metric spaces. In particular, they present a new result
on Nash consistency of upper semicontinuous representations.
The remaining four chapters of the book constitute its second part and con-
sider a special kind of game forms, social choice functions. Since a social choice
function assigns an alternative to any profile of individual preferences, it is a
game form with the strategies of the players being their individual preferences.
Chapter 8 is an introduction to the second part of the book. In particular, the
authors recall the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for social choice functions
3and discuss some approaches to the implications of this theorem. Peleg and
Peters investigate exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions, i.e.,
social choice functions that have for each profile of (true) preferences a strong
Nash equilibrium which yields the sincere outcome. They briefly discuss vot-
ing on restricted domains, and the concept of equilibrium with threats. The
class of exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions is analyzed in
the rest of the book, where several existence and characterization results are
presented. In Chapter 9 these social choice functions are investigated by using
feasible elimination procedures. The authors present a new proof of the charac-
terization result. In Chapter 10 the analysis of exactly and strongly consistent
representations is extended to general effectivity functions. It contains charac-
terizations of elimination stable effectivity functions, i.e., effectivity functions
such that the set of alternatives resulting from applying feasible elimination
procedures is non-empty. Chapter 11 concerns consistent voting systems with
a continuum of voters. In particular, Peleg and Peters extend the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem and the concept of feasible elimination procedures to
this framework, and extend most of their results of Chapters 9 and 10 to vot-
ing games with a continuum of voters. An almost complete characterization
of anonymous exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions in this
model is presented.
The book has several merits. First of all, I think that the choice of the
subject in question for the book was quite fortunate. It was a long time ago
when a specialized book on effectivity functions in social choice appeared. I
have in mind, of course, the book by Joseph Abdou and Hans Keiding (1991)
in which both formal properties of effectivity functions and their applications
in Social Choice Theory (in particular, in the implementation problem) have
been presented. While some parts of the book by Peleg and Peters owe to
several publications by Abdou and Keiding, this new book has taken a differ-
ent road. In particular, as the authors mention themselves, the theory in their
monograph should be distinguished from what is typically called implementa-
tion theory. Moreover, during the last twenty years significant contributions
on the subjects in question have appeared in the literature, and it is important
that we can find them all recalled in the book by Peleg and Peters.
Another merit of the book, desirable although not always evidently found
in a scientific production, is the very high expertise and professionalism. When
we take the book in our hands for the first time and combine the information
on the contents of the monograph and on its authors, we feel immediately that
what we are going to read is an excellent book. The authors do know perfectly
what they are writing about, something that is also confirmed by the list of
cited works: almost 20% out of 73 references are the own contributions of the
two authors.
Moreover, as I have already emphasized when describing the contents of the
manuscript, the book is very well written and perfectly organized, something
we also recognize in the former publications of the two authors. Despite that
the topics are far from being easy, the material is presented in a clear way.
Very helpful are motivating discussions and numerous nice examples. Finally,
4we can fully enjoy the beauty of the results and their rigorous proofs presented
in the book.
Summarizing, I can highly recommend the book by Bezalel Peleg and Hans
Peters: a real pleasure for scholars working on effectivity functions and social
choice functions, and a great learning opportunity for those who are not that
familiar with the topics in question. It is an excellent contribution, bringing
together a lot of material in a single manuscript in a coherent way. However,
one warning should be repeated as well. If you are searching for an easy and
straightforward literature, you should rather look for something else. Also,
if you like to investigate a new field which could easily contain many open
questions, this book is not your best choice. The authors present material that
is dense and contains many deep results, and consequently they do not provide
‘tips’ for further research. And if one could still find an open question in the
book, like the one in Chapter 11 on characterization of anonymous exactly
and strongly consistent social choice functions in the model with a continuum
of voters, it will be indeed a real challenge.
Let me finally express one more thought, in line with what I have just writ-
ten above. Reading the monograph by Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters brought
to my mind a comparison with climbing in some beautiful and challenging
mountains. It is very difficult to climb there and in principle not everybody
can do it. First of all, you need a formal rigorous training, otherwise you are
lost after one minute of the escapade, in the first chapter. And there might be
moments that you say ‘Come on! Why am I doing that? Would it not be better
just to stay quietly at home and not to lose so much energy with something
that I can never achieve? ...’ But! If you are determined and patient enough,
step by step you go up and up, and finally there is this desirable moment when
you are on the top of the hill. And it recompenses all suffering that you have
just experienced. You are so happy and proud of yourself, and you enjoy so
much the beauty of the landscape, the beauty of mathematics ... And then
you notice another hill, even higher and more tempting ... and you move to a
subsequent chapter, to a more complicated demonstration of another result ...
Since no particular criticism has struck me during reading the book, I did
not force myself to search artificially some drawbacks. I like to wish to all read-
ers of this excellent book many wonderful moments of climbing in the beautiful
challenging mountains called Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations
of Constitutions.
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